Tryg Insurance v. CH Robinson Worldwide Inc by unknown
2019 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-19-2019 
Tryg Insurance v. CH Robinson Worldwide Inc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019 
Recommended Citation 
"Tryg Insurance v. CH Robinson Worldwide Inc" (2019). 2019 Decisions. 346. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019/346 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2019 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________________ 
 
No. 17-3768 
________________ 
 
TRYG INSURANCE, a/s/o Toms Confectionery Group; 
TOMS CONFECTIONERY GROUP 
 
v. 
 
C.H. ROBINSON WORLDWIDE, INC.; 
NATIONAL REFRIGERATED TRUCKING, LLC; 
 
C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.,  
          Appellant 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D. C. Civil Action No. 3-15-cv-05343) 
District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on October 5, 2018  
 
Before:  SHWARTZ, SCIRICA and ROTH, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: April 19, 2019) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION∗ 
________________ 
 
                                              
∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
  
Toms Confectionary Group, a Danish chocolate company, and Tryg Insurance, its 
insurer, brought suit against transportation company C.H. Robinson Worldwide (CHRW) 
after a shipment of Toms’ miniature chocolate liqueur bottles was damaged in transit.  
The central question in this case is whether CHRW is a carrier or a broker.  Under the 
Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, a carrier is liable for 
damages incurred during a shipment of goods, whereas a broker—someone who merely 
arranges for transportation—is not liable.1  Following a bench trial on the issue of 
liability, the District Court ruled that CHRW was a carrier rather than a broker and 
therefore liable for the damages caused to the miniature chocolate liqueur bottles.  
CHRW urges us to hold that it is instead a broker.  Because we find no error in the 
District Court’s determination that CHRW held itself out as a carrier and thus qualified as 
such under the Carmack Amendment, we will affirm.   
I 
Toms hired CHRW in July 2013 to transport a shipment of miniature chocolate 
liquor bottles from Levittown, Pennsylvania, to Cranbury, New Jersey.  Unbeknownst to 
Toms, CHRW subcontracted with National Refrigerated Trucking, LLC, (NRT) to 
transport the chocolate; the agreement between CHRW and NRT contained a 
confidentiality clause.  Due to a malfunction of NRT’s truck’s refrigeration system, the 
                                              
1 49 U.S.C. § 14706. 
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chocolate melted and was destroyed.  Non-party Coregistics, the recipient of the damaged 
chocolate, completed a non-conformance report on the day of delivery, July 16, 2013, 
and Toms submitted a claim to CHRW shortly thereafter.  CHRW did not accept the 
claim or pay the loss.  Tryg later paid Toms the value of the cargo less Toms’ deductible 
under its insurance policy.     
Tryg and Toms brought suit against CHRW for breach of contract of motor 
carriage.2  In the course of pre-trial proceedings, the parties stipulated that the amount of 
damages was $124,034.31.  The parties also agreed that CHRW could only be held liable 
if it were a “carrier” as opposed to a “broker.”  The court held a bench trial on the issue 
of liability on May 4, 2017.  At trial, Toms called its Customer Service Representative, 
Michael Bastholm, and CHRW called its Risk Manager for the North American Surface 
Transportation Division, Christopher McLoughlin.  The parties also entered into evidence 
deposition testimony from an Account Executive at CHRW, Janet Hays, who was 
Bastholm’s point of contact.  The District Court found that CHRW possessed a broker’s 
license and not a motor carrier’s license, and did not own trucks or other equipment to 
transport cargo.  Nevertheless, based on the testimony and the shipment documents, the 
court held that CHRW had held itself out as a carrier and was therefore liable for the 
damages.  CHRW now appeals.   
                                              
2 Plaintiffs also named NRT as codefendants, but NRT failed to appear.  The District 
Court entered a default judgment against NRT and found NRT and CHRW jointly and 
severally liable.  Only CHRW appealed, and so our decision here pertains only to 
CHRW.   
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II3 
The statutory text makes clear that being a carrier entails more than just physically 
picking up shipments and transferring them to a different location.  The definition of 
“carrier” includes “motor carriers,” which are defined as “person[s] providing motor 
vehicle transportation for compensation.”4  The term “transportation” is then defined to 
include “services related to” (including “arranging for”) the movement of property.5  
Thus, the definition of “carrier” encompasses entities that perform services other than 
physical transportation.   
As the District Court correctly stated, in determining whether a party is a carrier or 
a broker, the crucial question is whether the party has legally bound itself to transport 
goods by accepting responsibility for ensuring the delivery of the goods.6  If an entity 
accepts responsibility for ensuring the delivery of goods, then that entity qualifies as a 
carrier regardless of whether it conducted the physical transportation.  Conversely, if an 
entity merely agrees to locate and hire a third party to transport the goods, then it is acting 
                                              
3 On appeal from a bench trial, we review the District Court’s findings of fact for clear 
error and review its conclusions of law de novo.  VICI Racing, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, 
Inc., 763 F.3d 273, 282-83 (3d Cir. 2014).   
4 49 U.S.C. § 13102(3), (14).  In 1995, Congress passed the Interstate Commerce 
Commission Termination Act, Pub. L. No. 104–88, 109 Stat. 803, which merged the 
formerly separate classifications of common and contract carriers into one classification 
of motor carriers.  M. Fortunoff of Westbury Corp. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 432 F.3d 127, 
132 (2d Cir. 2005). 
5 49 U.S.C. § 13102(23).   
6 Essex Ins. Co. v. Barrett Moving & Storage, Inc., 885 F.3d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 2018).  
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as a broker.7  This distinction “tracks longstanding common-law rules” and derives from 
the “commonsense proposition that when a party holds itself out as the party responsible 
for the care and delivery of another’s property, it cannot outsource its contractual 
responsibility by outsourcing the care and delivery it agreed to provide.”8  The 
Department of Transportation, which is responsible for interpreting the Interstate 
Commerce Act (of which the Carmack Amendment is a part), has similarly instructed 
that motor carriers are not brokers just because they “arrange or offer to arrange the 
transportation of shipments which they are authorized to transport and which they have 
accepted and legally bound themselves to transport.”9  In sum, if a party has accepted 
responsibility for transporting a shipment, it is a carrier. 
The District Court did not clearly err in determining, based on the testimony 
presented at trial, that CHRW held itself out as a carrier.10  As Toms and CHRW had no 
standing contract, the court assessed their relationship using the parties’ course of dealing 
and communications, in particular between Bastholm and Hays.11  Hays, the CHRW 
                                              
7 See, e.g., id. at 1301-02; Nipponkoa Ins. Co. v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 2011 
WL 671747, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2011); CGU Int’l Ins., PLC v. Keystone Lines 
Corp., C-02-3751, 2004 WL 1047982, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2004).    
8 Essex Ins. Co., 885 F.3d at 1301; see also id. (finding nothing in either “the Carmack 
Amendment’s language nor its legislative history [to] indicate[] that Congress intended 
this principle to operate differently in the interstate-transportation context”).   
9 49 C.F.R. § 371.2(a).   
10 The testimony and documentary evidence distinguish this case from cases like 
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. SS “HANJIN KWANGYANG”, 92 Civ. 5763, 1995 WL 
539635 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 1995), where the only pieces of evidence that an entity acted 
as a carrier instead of a broker were the complaint and the listing of the entity as a carrier 
on the bill of lading.  Id. at *3.   
11 McLoughlin, CHRW’s Risk Manager, testified that he never had any contact with 
anyone at Toms.   
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Account Executive, indicated to Bastholm, the Toms employee, that CHRW could 
arrange to ship Toms’ goods and “ma[d]e it sound like it[ was] seamless.”  Bastholm 
communicated with Hays to schedule shipments and request shipment quotes, and at no 
point did CHRW make clear that it was acting only as a broker.  Bastholm’s 
understanding, based on his course of dealing with Hays, was that CHRW took 
responsibility for the goods and arranged for their transportation.  The parties had an 
agreement for CHRW to transport the goods, and that is what Toms paid CHRW to do.   
The documents submitted into evidence at trial provide further support for the 
District Court’s holding.  The Bill of Lading and the packing list, both prepared by non-
party Assured Packing Inc., identified CHRW as “carrier,” a designation to which 
CHRW did not object.12  CHRW’s invoice to Toms contained line items for “line haul” 
and a “fuel surcharge” for 30 miles, the distance between Levittown and Cranbury, 
consistent with an entity acting as a carrier.  The invoice did not refer to brokerage 
commissions or NRT’s role in the transportation.  Moreover, despite CHRW’s testimony 
that it had done business with Toms for several years, CHRW could produce no 
document or communication in which it identified itself to Toms as a broker.  In fact, 
CHRW did not claim it was a broker instead of a carrier until after the start of this 
                                              
12 While NRT also appears on this document, that does not negate CHRW’s role as a 
carrier. 
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litigation.13  While CHRW’s Terms and Conditions suggest that CHRW is a non-asset 
based transportation provider, they do not make clear that CHRW is only a broker, and in 
any event the Terms and Conditions are only referred to, not included, on the invoice.   
CHRW argues that (1) it did not give its consent to be listed as a carrier on the bill 
of lading, (2) it never took physical possession of the cargo, (3) it entered into an 
independent contractor relationship with NRT, and (4) Toms’ failure to investigate 
CHRW’s services was inexcusable.  None of these arguments will suffice to call into 
question the District Court’s fact-intensive inquiry into the parties’ course of conduct and 
communications or overturn the court’s conclusion that CHRW held itself out as a carrier 
and should be held liable.  We therefore will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                              
13 The International Surveyors & Adjusters (USA) report on the incident, dated 
December 4, 2013, does include the information that CHRW “appointed” NRT to 
conduct the physical transportation, but this knowledge reached Toms long after the 
incident and does not affect the question of whether CHRW held itself out to Toms as a 
carrier.  A337.   
